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Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games* 
Jeffrey S. Banks, University of Rochester 
This paper analyzes a general model of two-player bargaining in the shadow of war, where one 
player possesses private information concerning the expected benefits of war. I derive conclusions 
about equilibrium behavior by examining incentive compatibility constraints, where these constraints 
hold regardless of the game form; hence, the qualitative results are "game-free." I show that the 
higher the informed player's payoff from war, the higher is his or her equilibrium payoff from settling 
the dispute short of war, and the higher is the equilibrium probability of war. The latter result ratio-
nalizes the monotonicity assumption prevalent in numerous expected utility models of war. I then 
provide a general result concerning the equilibrium relationship between settlement payoffs and the 
probability of war. 
I. Introduction 
A common perception among analysts studying crisis bargaining situations 
is that the presence of informational asymmetries plays a key role in determining 
the behavior of the participants (cf. Powell 1987 and the citations therein). For 
quite some time, however, the tools necessary to explore such private informa-
tion environments rigorously did not exist, thereby restricting the analyst to a 
class of models-namely, complete information models-which were clearly 
inappropriate for the task at hand. Beginning with the seminal work of Harsanyi 
(1967-68), game theory has advanced to a stage where it is now capable of 
dealing with issues of incomplete information, leading to numerous applications 
in economics and, to a lesser extent, political science. On the crisis bargaining 
front, various authors have incorporated these advances to reformulate earlier 
theories and to generate predictions concerning the role of information transmis-
sion, acquisition, and misperception in determining crisis bargaining outcomes 
(e.g., Powell 1987; Morrow 1989; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1989). 
One of the benefits of formulating a game-theoretic model is the necessity 
of explicitly modeling all of the relevant decisions by the participants, the timing 
of such decisions, and so forth. Yet such precision can also be seen as a drawback 
in that it may be unclear whether the conclusions deduced from a particular 
model are robust to other specifications of the game. Such a limitation is particu-
larly acute in models of bargaining: should one party be able to make a "take-it-
or-leave it" offer to the other? Does one player make all the offers, while the 
other simply accepts or rejects? Is the appropriate model one of alternating of-
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600 Jeffrey S. Banks 
fers, and if so, how long can the bargaining persist? Such indeterminacy in the 
selection of the "right" model potentially undermines the applicability of results 
derived from any particular model. 
However, it turns out that there exists a class of results that concern equilib-
rium behavior in games with incomplete information which are robust to the 
specifics of the game the players actually play. That is, these results have the 
feature that they hold for any equilibrium in any game in which private infor-
mation is present; in this sense then the results are "game-free." The results are 
derived from a set of constraints known as incentive compatibility conditions, 
where these conditions are a necessary feature of any optimal strategy adopted 
by a player with private information. In the current paper these conditions are 
examined in the context of a simple crisis bargaining situation in which one of 
the participants possesses private information concerning the benefits and costs 
of war. Examples of such information include a country's military capabilities 
(Morrow 1989) and the political fallout from war (Bueno de Mesquita and Lal-
man 1989). Rather than specify a particular process through which the partici-
pants interact (i.e., the game they play), we simply assume that through some 
bargaining process the participants either settle the dispute or do not. If they fail 
to settle, a war ensues; otherwise, they agree on some resolution of the dispute. 
We are able to show that in any equilibrium of any game with the above 
format, the probability of war is an increasing function of the expected benefits 
from war of the informed player. Thus, whereas decision-theoretic models at 
times assume that stronger countries are more likely to engage in war (cf. Bueno 
de Mesquita and Lalman 1986; Lalman 1988), we are able to derive such a 
condition as a necessary consequence of optimal behavior. Further, the expected 
benefits from successfully concluding the bargaining short of war are also 
increasing in the informed player's expected benefits of war. Therefore, in 
any equilibrium of a crisis bargaining game, the following trade-off occurs: 
"stronger" countries (i.e., those with greater expected benefits from war) are 
more likely to end up in a war; yet if the bargaining negotiations are successful 
and war is averted, stronger countries receive a better settlement as well. Further, 
these conclusions hold regardless of the specifics of the bargaining game or the 
selection of a particular equilibrium from the set of equilibria in such a game. 
Following the derivation of these monotonicity results, we proceed to char-
acterize the "equilibrium" relationship between the probability of war and the 
expected benefits conditional on no war. That is, given a probability of war, 
where this is a function of the informed player's information, we can derive the 
"settlement" function that together with the former, constitutes equilibrium be-
havior. In this way then we can identify the subset of (pairs of) functions "ra-
tionalizable" as equilibrium behavior and derive further inferences about such 
behavior in crisis bargaining games. 
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2. The Model 
The model concerns the behavior of two players, labeled 1 and 2, who 
attempt to resolve a dispute through some bargaining process; failure to resolve 
the dispute leads to war. Let X = [0, l] denote the set of all possible outcomes 
from the bargaining process other than war, where X contains any notion of a 
status quo ante, x0 , and let w denote the war outcome. We assume that both 
players 1 and 2 are risk neutral with respect to outcomes in X and that their 
preferences are diametrically opposed on X; thus, let the utility of player 1 from 
an outcome x' E X be simply x', while the utility for player 2 is 1 - x' .1 The 
utility for players 1 and 2 from the war outcome is denoted u and v, respectively, 
where we think of (u, v) as reduced form expressions that summarize the ex-
pected benefits of war. That is, during the bargaining process, the players will 
have expectations concerning the likelihood of winning a war should one occur, 
the gains from winning the war, the losses from losing the war, and the costs 
involved; these expressions are aggregated into the players' expected benefits of 
war. Further, player 1 is assumed to possess private information concerning the 
values of (u, v), while player 2 does not. For example, player 1 may know more 
about his own military capabilities than does player 2; therefore, since the ex-
pected benefits of war will be a function of l's military capability, 1 will possess 
an informational advantage vis-a-vis 2 about the values (u, v). 
I model this in the usual Harsanyi (1967-68) framework as a Bayesian 
environment where player l's private information is described by a set of 
"types" T, where for each type t E T there exists a unique pair of values ( u, v). 
Thus, we can write u and v as functions of the parameter t. Player 1 knows the 
actual value of t E T prior to making any decisions, while player 2 possesses a 
common knowledge prior probability/(-) over the set T, where fit) > 0 for all t 
E T. Let T = [1, t] C lffi+, and assume u( ·)is differentiable and strictly increas-
ing in t, so that higher types receive greater expected benefits from engaging in 
a war. 
At this point the common game-theoretic approach is to posit a particular 
game form for players 1 and 2 and then to analyze the resulting Bayesian game, 
where a game form characterizes (1) the set of decisions D; available to player i, 
i = 1, 2, and (2) a (probabilistic) outcome function G describing the likeli-
hood of any one outcome in X U { w} occurring as a function of the chosen 
decisions (d1 , d2 ). 2 Thus, in any game a decision profile generates a probability 
1 Relaxing risk neutrality and assuming instead that player 1 (2) has a strictly increasing (de-
creasing) utility function over X would not alter the monotonicity results in section 3 (see note 7) and 
would simply make the characterization result in section 4 more cumbersome. 
21f the game is one with sequential moves, then a player's decision describes the action he· or 
she would take in every contingency. 
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p of war occurring and a probability distribution over the set X of settlement 
outcomes conditional on no war; by risk neutrality we can associate with the 
latter the expected settlement x E [O, 1] conditional on no war. Therefore, we 
can view the outcome function G as a pair of mappings 
where 8s(d1 , d2 ) is the expected settlement given the decisions (d1 , d2 ), and 
8w(di. d2 ) is the associated probability of war. Since player 1 knows the value 
oft E T prior to any decision making, he is able to condition his choice of d1 E 
D 1 on the realized value oft. Thus, a (pure) strategy for player 1 in the Bayesian 
game is a function cr1 : T ~ D 1 , where cr1 (t) E D 1 is the decision of player 1 
when his type is t E T. Player 2 does not possess any private information; thus, 
a (pure) strategy for player 2 is simply a selection cr2 E D 2 • 
A strategy profile (cr1 , cr2 ) and a type t E T thus generate, through the 
outcome function G, a probability of war 8w(cr1 (t), cr2 ) and an expected settle-
ment 8s(cr1 (t), cr2 ) conditional on no war. Since the players' preferences over 
such outcomes are well defined, we can discuss the optimality of a player's de-
cision given the opponent's decision and, hence, describe a notion of equilibrium 
in a game form (D1 , D 2 , G). For Bayesian games the appropriate generalization 
of the Nash equilibrium concept is known as Bayesian equilibrium (cf. Myerson 
1985), where a strategy profile (cr1 , cr2 ) constitutes a Bayesian equilibrium if (1) 
for all t E T, cr1 (t) is a best response to cr2 and (2) cr2 is a best resptmse to cr1 
based on player 2's beliefs/(-) concerning player l's type (and hence, through 
cr1 , player l's decision). 
As noted in the Introduction, however, the motivation for the current paper 
concerns not the qualitative properties of equilibrium behavior in a particular 
Bayesian game but rather properties of any equilibrium in any Bayesian game. 
Therefore, the analytical trade-off chosen here is toward general results that are 
not a function of the particulars of the game structure (i.e., D 1 , D 2 , G) or the 
selection of a single equilibrium within a Bayesian game, at the expense of a 
precise prediction concerning the behavior of the participants and the subsequent 
ability to carry out comparative statics exercises. However, as we shall see, the 
general results do have the flavor of comparative statics results in that they de-
scribe changes in outcomes as a function of a variable-namely, player l's type, 
upon which player 1 can condition his behavior but player 2 cannot. In particular, 
all of the results will specify the relative likelihood of any outcome as a function 
of player 1 's private information concerning the expected benefits from going 
to war. 
From the above discussion, we see that any strategy profile (cr1 , cr2 ) in a 
Bayesian game generates an outcome (x, p) as a function of player l's type, by 
X(!) = 8s(CT1 (t), CT2), p(t) = 8w(CT1 (t), CT2). Let 
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0 = {(x, p): x: T~ [0, l], p: T~ [0, 1]} 
denote the set of all possible outcomes from all possible Bayesian games. Clearly 
not every element of 0 is necessarily derived from an equilibrium of some game; 
thus, what we would like is a criterion for selecting those elements of n that are 
rationalizable in the sense that they are generated as equilibrium behavior of 
some Bayesian game. Let 
U(t; x, p) = p(t)u(t) + [l - p(t)]x(t) 
denote player l's expected utility from the outcome (x, p) given type t E T, 
where we assume that there exists a strategy profile (o-1 , o-2 ) generating (x, p). 
To determine whether or not o-1 and o-2 constitute equilibrium strategies in some 
game would obviously require knowledge of all available strategies and (through 
G) outcomes, since, for example, o-1 (t) must be the best action from the set D 1 
for player 1 if type t. Yet even without such knowledge, we can identify a class 
of alternative strategies and outcomes that exist for player 1. Since player l's 
type only affects the war utilities ( u, v) and not the available decisions D 1, one 
alternative for player 1 to any strategy o-1 is to have some type t "mimic" the 
behavior suggested for some other type t', that is, play according to o-1 (t') rather 
than o-1 (t). Since player 2's strategy is independent of player l's (by the Nash 
assumption), this then generates the outcome (x(t'), p(t')) rather than (x(t), 
p(t)). 3 Define 
U(t', t; x, p) = p(t')u(t) + [l - p(t')]x(t') 
as the expected utility for player 1 from acting as if his type were t' when his 
type is actually t. If there exists types t, t' E T such that U(t) < U(t', t), then 
player 1 can choose strategy a-;, defined as o-; ( f) = a-1 ( f) for all f ¥- t and o-; ( t) 
= o-1 (t'), receive the same expected utility for all f ¥- t and receive a strictly 
higher expected utility for t. Since the definition of Bayesian equilibrium as-
sumes optimal behavior for player 1 "type-by-type," this then contradicts the 
assumption of (o-1 , o-2 ) being an equilibrium or, in particular, the assumption of 
o-1 being a best response to o-2 • But since this holds for all games where there 
exists a strategy profile generating (x, p), this implies that if U(t) < U(t', t) for 
some t, t' E T then the outcome (x, p) is not associated with equilibrium behav-
ior in any game. Thus, a necessary condition for an outcome (x, p) to be gener-
ated by equilibrium behavior is that it be incentive compatible (d' Aspremont and 
Gerard-Varet 1979). 4 
3 Recall that in a sequential move game the actions chosen by one player may be a function of 
the actions of the opponent, yet a player's strategy, which assigns a (possibly different) action at 
each of the player's information sets, is chosen independently of the opponent's strategy. 
4 Incentive compatibility is also sufficient: let D 1 = T, D 2 be any set, and for all d2 E D2 let 
g,(t, d2 ) = x(t), gw(I, d2 ) = p(t) (i.e., player 2's role is suppressed). Then since (x, p) is incentive 
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DEFINITION: An outcome (x, p) E fl is incentive compatible if and only if 
for all t, t' ET, U(t; x, p) ;?! U(t', t; x, p). 
In particular, for any t, t' E T, incentive compatibility implies the following 
inequalities hold: 
p(t)u(t) + [l - p(t)]x(t) ;?! p(t')u(t) + [1 - p(t')]x(t'), 
p(t')u(t') + [1 - p(t')]x(t') ;?! p(t)u(t') + [1 - p(t)]x(t). 
(1) 
(2) 
Equation (1) says that type t receives at least as high an expected utility from the 
outcome (x(t), p(t)) as he would from (x(t'), p(t')), while equation (2) says that 
for t' the opposite is true. Thus, our principle criterion for identifying the set of 
equilibrium outcomes is to examine only those outcomes that are incentive 
compatible. 5 
An additional restriction I place on outcomes has more to do with the nature 
of the games I wish to examine, in the following sense: suppose (x, p) is derived 
from some equilibrium profile, and t E T is such that p(t) < 1, that is, with 
some probability player 1 does not go to war if his type is t. Then we would 
expect that in any reasonable game x(t), the equilibrium payoff from resolving 
the dispute, would be at least as large as u(t), the expected payoff from war. 
Otherwise, so long as there exists some bargaining strategy (e.g., always de-
manding everything) which generates a payoff of at least u(t), player 1 would 
never accept a settlement less than u(t). Thus, the additional constraint is that 
the outcome (x, p) be "individually rational," in the sense of generating a payoff 
to player 1 that is at least as high as he could get from simply fighting, where 
this holds for each type (i.e., "interim" individual rationality). Given (x, p) E 
fl let Tb(x, p) = {t E T : p(t) < 1} denote those types who with positive 
probability resolve the dispute in the bargaining process. Individual rationality 
then implies that for all t E Tb, x(t) ;?! u(t) or, equivalently, that for all t E T, 
U(t) ;?! u(t). Let fl* s fl denote the set of outcomes (x, p) that are incentive 
compatible and individually rational. 
3. Monotonicity Results 
In this section we derive some qualitative features of elements of the set 
fl*, with the conclusion being that such features hold in any equilibrium of any 
Bayesian game where the set of outcomes and the preferences (i.e., the environ-
compatible, the strategy 0'1(t) = tis optimal for player l, thereby generating (x, p). The result that 
incentive compatibility is necessary and sufficient for equilibrium behavior is known in the econom-
ics literature as ·the revelation principle (cf. Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin 1979; Myerson 1979; 
and Rosenthal 1978). 
'Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) use this approach to characterize equilibrium outcomes in 
a bilateral bargaining environment. Incentive compatibility conditions and the revelation principle 
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ment) are as described above. Our first result concerns the likelihood of war as a 
function of player l's type. 
LEMMA 1: If (x, p) E fl*, then p(t) is weakly increasing on T. 
PROOF: Let t' > t. Subtracting the right-hand side (RHS) of equation (2) 
from the left-hand side (LHS) of equation (1), and the LHS of (2) from the RHS 
of (1), we get 
x(t) - p(t)[x(t) - u(t)] - {x(t) - p(t)[x(t) - u(t')]} ~ (3) 
x(t') - p(t')[x(t') - u(t)] - {x(t') - p(t')[x(t') - u(t')]}. 
Canceling terms, we get 
p(t')[u(t') - u(t)] ~ p(t)[u(t') - u(t)]. (4) 
Since t' > t and u(·) is strictly increasing, p(t') ~ p(t). QED 
Thus, given the environment outlined in section 2, for any game form (D 1 , 
D2 , G) and any equilibrium (<T1 , <T2 ) of the resulting Bayesian game, the proba-
bility of war gw(<T1 (t), <T2 ) is weakly increasing in t (i.e., in equilibrium the 
probability of war is an increasing function of player l's expected benefits from 
war). This justifies the assumption in the expected utility models of Bueno de 
Mesquita and Lalman (1986) and Lalman (1988) that a decision maker with a 
higher expected benefit from war will be more likely to go to war; indeed Lemma 
1 shows this to be the only assumption consistent with rational behavior in an 
incomplete information environment. 6 It also shows how the presence of such 
monotonicity in the equilibria analyzed by Morrow (1989) is not an artifact of 
the particular game form assumed nor an artifact of any selection from among 
the set of Bayesian equilibria in the game. 
With regard to the expected settlement x(t) conditional on not fighting, it is 
clear that for t ft. Tb such a value is not relevant, since these types always go to 
war. For the remaining types, however, the next result shows the monotonicity 
implied by incentive compatibility and individual rationality. 
LEMMA 2: If (x, p) E fl* then x(t) is weakly increasing on Tb. 
PROOF: Let t', t E Tb and t' > t, so (by Lemma 1) 1 > p(t') ~ p(t). Since 
x(t) ~ u(t) V t E Tb (by individual rationality), 
p(t')u(t') + [l - p(t')]x(t') ~ p(t)u(t') + [l - p(t)]x(t'). (5) 
are also useful for deriving optimal allocation schemes (Harris and Raviv 1981), optimal contracts 
in principle-agent settings (Holmstrnm 1979), and even equilibrium strategies in particular Bayesian 
games (Banks 1989). 
6See Lalman (1988) for a discussion of the monotonicity assumption in expected utility 
models. 
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The LHS of equation (5) is equal to the LHS of equation (2); thus, combining 
(5) and (2) yields 
p(t)u(t') + [1 - p(t)]x(t) ~ p(t)u(t') + [1 - p(t)]x(t'). (6) 
Canceling terms and then dividing both sides by [1 - p(t)] (which is nonzero, 
since p(t) < 1) implies x(t') ~ x(t). QED 
Thus, while higher types go to war at least as often as lower types, they also 
receive at least as high expected benefits if no war is fought. 7 The next result 
shows that, if one of these relations is strict the other must be as well. 
LEMMA 3: If (x, p) E fl*, t' > t, and t, t' E Tb, then x(t') > x(t) if and 
only if p(t') > p(t). 
PROOF: Suppose not; by Lemmas 1 and 2 there are only two cases to 
consider: 
(i) x(t') > x(t) and p(t') = p(t); but this contradicts equation (1), since 
p(t) < 1. 
(ii) x(t') = x(t) and p(t') > p(t); but this contradicts equation (2). 
QED 
Therefore, in crisis bargaining situations, equilibrium analysis predicts the 
following trade-off between the gains from settling the dispute and the proba-
bility of war: as the expected benefits of war increase, the informed player re-
ceives a better negotiated settlement but in addition runs a greater risk of war. 
Furthermore, this prediction is derived from the general properties of optimizing 
behavior of the participants and hence will hold in any crisis bargaining model 
with the incomplete information environment detailed in section 2. 
Incentive compatibility of course also implies such trade-offs are beneficial 
for all types; indeed, the next result shows that the equilibrium expected utility 
of player 1 is increasing in t. Let Tw = {t E T: p(t) > O} denote those types 
that with positive probability go to war. 
LEMMA 4: If (x, p) E fl*, then U(t; x, p) is continuous, weakly increasing 
on T, and strictly increasing on T w. 
PROOF: Suppose t' > t, t, t' E Tw, and U(t) ~ U(t'), implying 
p(t)u(t) + [1 - p(t)]x(t) ~ p(t')u(t') + [1 - p(t')]x(t'). (7) 
7 Suppose we drop risk neutrality and assume player 1 has a strictly increasing utility function 
z over X. so z(x(t)) denotes l's utility from the settlement x(t). Let 4(t) denote the expected utility 
conditional on no war for type t from the outcome (x, p). Then it is easily seen that Lemma 1 
continues to hold, while Lemma 2 holds with 4 replacing x, i.e. the expected utility, rather than the 
expected settlement. 
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Then since u(t') > u(t), 
p(t)u(t') + [1 - p(t)]x(t) ~ p(t')u(t') + [1 - p(t')]x(t') , (8) 
implying if t, t' E Tw (i .e . , p(t), p(t') > 0) then V(t, t'; x, p) > V(t'), contra-
dicting incentive compatibility. If t, t' ff Tw then clearly incentive compatibility 
implies x(t) = x(t') , yielding V(t) = V(t') . To see VO is continuous, note that 
V(·) monotone implies that any discontinuities are jump discontinuities , so for 
all t E T the left- and right-hand limits of VO at t, lim,_ V(·) and lim1+ V(·), 
exist. If V(') is discontinuous at t , then lim1+ V( ·) - lim,_ V(') ~ E > 0 . Choose 
types t - 3 and t + 3; then since u( ·) is assumed to be differentiable and hence 
continuous, for 3 sufficiently small V(t - 3; x, p) < V(t + 3, t - 3; x, p), 
contradicting incentive compatibility. QED 
From Lemma 4 we know the equilibrium utility of player 1 is increasing in 
his type. However, a different result comes about when we consider the expected 
gain in utility for player 1 above that generated by war. For any (x , p) E 0 let 
!::..(t; x , p) = V(t; x, p) - u(t) denote this difference. 
LEMMA 5: If (x, p) E O*, then !::..(t; x , p) is weakly decreasing on T and 
strictly decreasing on Tb . 
PROOF: If t E T\Tb then V(t) = u(t) , so the result follows. Fort E Tb, 
incentive compatibility implies that for all t' , 
!::..(t) = [x(t) - u(t)]·[l - p(t)] ~ [x(t') - u(t)]·[l - p(t')] . (9) 
Let t' > t and t' E Tb ; then since u( ·) is strictly increasing, 
[x(t') - u(t)]·[l - p(t')] > [x(t') - u(t')]·[l - p(t')] = !::..(t') . (10) 
Combining equations (9) and (10), we get !::..(t) > !::..(t'). QED 
Thus, the gain from participating in the bargaining process and potentially 
resolving the dispute over simply going to war is decreasing in player l 's ex-
pected benefits from such a war. In addition , Lemma 5 implies that if (x, p) is 
incentive compatible, then we need only check the individual rationality con-
straint V(t; x, p) - u(t) ~ 0 at tb =sup {t E Tb}, since if it is satisfied at tb by 
Lemma 5 it will be satisfied for all t < tb as well. 
It is easily seen that none of the above results are sensitive to player 2 's prior 
belief f( ·) concerning 1 's type, the functional form of u( ·), the assumption that 
Tis not finite, or (for that matter) the preferences or actions of player 2. Rather, 
these monotonicity results are derived simply through the optimizing behavior of 
player 1 and the willingness and ability of player 1 to differentiate his bargaining 
behavior as a function of his information concerning the expected benefits of 
war. Hence, what drives the results is not the competition among the players per 
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se but the ability of player 1 to make his decisions contingent upon payoff-
relevant and private information. 
Suppose that we add a little bit more structure to the bargaining process 
we envision. In particular, let player 1 be the "initiator" of the crisis, in that the 
first move of the process has player 1 selecting whether to stay with the status 
quo ante, namely, the outcome (x0 , 0), or begin the bargaining. This structure 
then places an additional "individual rationality" restriction on the equilibrium 
set of outcomes in that for all t E T the following condition must hold: U(t; x, 
p) = p(t)u(t) + [1 - p(t)]x(t) ;;:: x0 • This follows, since now player 1 can 
guarantee himself a payoff of x0 by simply failing to initiate a crisis. For any (x, 
p) E il let Ts = {t E T: x(t) = x0 , p(t) = 0} denote those types t E T that 
unilaterally select the (x0 , 0) outcome. 8 Now if (x, p) E il* is such that Ts =I= </>, 
then for all t ff. T,, p(t) > 0. This follows, since if not, then for some t ff. Ts 
p(t) = 0 but x(t) > x0 , which contradicts Lemma 3. Therefore, Ts = T\Tw, and 
all types that do not receive the status quo outcome face a positive probability of 
going to war. This conforms to the "selection bias" noted in Bueno de Mesquita 
(1981) and Morrow (1989), in that, conditional on a crisis occurring (i.e., player 
1 not selecting (x0 , 0)), the posterior probability distribution of player l's type 
should not be the same as the prior belief but rather should place positive weight 
only on those types not in Ts. In addition, Lemma 1 tells us that this posterior 
distribution should place greater weight (relative to the prior) on higher types. 
The types of initiators that begin a crisis are thus not "typical" in the sense of 
being the expected type according to the prior f( ·) and neither are those that 
engage in war. Thus, for example, there will always exist a selection bias in the 
observed military capabilities of those countries that initiate crises and fight 
wars. 
4. A Characterization Theorem 
As noted above, all of the monotonicity results in section 3 go through if 
the set of types T is finite. With continuous types, however, we are able suc-
cinctly to characterize the set il* by using calculus-based techniques. Since x(· ), 
p( ·), and U ( ·) are monotone increasing and T is a closed interval, x( ·), p( ·), and 
UO are differentiable almost everywhere (i.e., except on a set of measure zero) 
(Royden 1968). In particular, for almost all t ET, either 
(i) p(t) = 1 and ap!iH = o, 
(ii) p(t) < 1 and ax/at = ap!at = o, or 
(iii) p(t) < 1 and ax/at > o, ap!at > o. 
'If we imagine an arbitrarily small cost to initiating the bargaining process, then the outcome 
(x0 , 0) cannot occur as an equilibrium outcome subsequent to initiating the process; hence, (x0 , 0) 
will only occur when player I selects this at the outset. 
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Types where case (i) holds are in T\Tb in that these types always go to war. We 
can think of those types where case (ii) holds as (locally) pooling, in that they 
either adopt the same behavioral strategies in the underlying game, or they adopt 
different strategies wherein these differences are irrelevant to the behavior by 
player 2 and the subsequent outcome. Those in case (iii) are separating, in that 
they are adopting distinctly different behavior in the underlying game. 9 Fix an 
outcome (x, p) E fl*, and consider the increase in the equilibrium utility U(t) 
for player 1 as t increases: 
au ax ap au 
- = - · [l - p(t)] - - · [x(t) - u(t)] + - · p(t). 
at at at at 
(11) 
For the pooling types and t E T\Tb, au/at = au/at · p(t). For the separating 
types, note that if (x, p) E fl*, the incentive compatibility condition U(t) ~ 
U(t', t) holds with equality at t' = t. This along with the differentiability of xO 
and p(-) implies the following "local" incentive compatibility condition: 
aU(t', t) I ax ap 
--, --'- = - · [l - p(t)] - - · [x(t) - u(t)] = 0. 
at ,.~, at at 
(12) 
Plugging equation (12) into equation (11), we get that for separating types au1at 
= au/at · p(t) as well. Thus, we have proven the following result. 
LEMMA 6: If (x, p) E fl*, then for almost all t E T, 
au au 
- = - . p(t). 
at at 
(13) 
Lemma 6 is analogous to the "envelope theorem" for single-person optimization 
problems (cf. Takayama 1986). Increasing player l's type has a "direct" effect 
on U(t) through the increase in players l's utility from war and an "indirect" 
effect through changes (if any) in the functions x(-) and p(-). Now given the 
behavior suggested by (x, p), we can think of each type as solving an optimiza-
tion program with regard to which type to act like, with the implication of incen-
tive compatibility being that in equilibrium each type optimally selects his true 
type. But then local incentive compatibility implies that these indirect effects 
vanish as we vary the "parameter" t along the derived solutions to player l's 
optimization program, which is simply the envelope theorem. Thus, in any equi-
librium of any Bayesian game, the increase in player l's equilibrium utility as a 
function of an increase in his type can be expressed as a simple function of the 
probability of war, p(t), and the marginal gain in expected benefits from war, 
au/at. 
9 Here I do not mean necessarily to imply that player l signals his information to player 2, 
since player l's behavior may only differ at some "final" move prior to war, where player 2 would 
not have any subsequent moves. 
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Note that local incentive compatibility actually holds for all types, no~ just 
separating types, since if t E. Tb then [1 - p(t)] = oplot = 0, while for t E Tb 
that are locally pooling oxlot = oplot = 0. Thus, if (x, p) E il* then equation 
(12) is satisfied almost everywhere. In addition, it turns out that local incentive 
compatibility, along with p(·) increasing and U(·) continuous, implies "global" 
incentive compatibility. 
LEMMA 7: If (x, p) E il is such that p(t) is increasing on T, U(t; x, p) 
is continuous on T, and equation (12) holds, then (x, p) is incentive 
compatible. 
PROOF: Rewrite U(t', t) as 
U(t', t) = U(t') + p(t')[u(t) - u(t')]. (14) 
Since equation (14) holds identically (i.e., for all t' E T), the derivatives of both 
sides are equal. Thus, for almost all t, t' E T, 
aU(t', t) = au + ap [u(t) _ u(t')] _ au . p(t'). 
at' at' at' at' 
(15) 
From Lemma 6, the first and last terms cancel. Thus, 
au(t', t) ap , 
--,- = 1[u(t) - u(t )]. 
at at 
(16) 
Since u( ·) is increasing and oplot ;;,: 0, oU(t', t)lot' ;;,: 0 if t > t' and aU(t', t)I 
ot' ~ 0 if t < t', so that U(t', t) is weakly increasing on [t, t) and weakly 
decreasing on (t, T]. This plus the continuity of U(t), which implies the conti-
nuity of U(t', t) at t, implies for all t E T, t E argmax,. U(t', t), so that (x, p) is 
incentive compatible. QED 
Thus (by Lemmas 1, 4, and 7), p(t) increasing, U(t; x, p) continuous, and 
local incentive compatibility (i.e., equation (12)) are necessary and sufficient 
conditions for incentive compatibility. Integrating both sides of equation (13), 
we see that for almost all t, 
I I 0 (f) U(t) = x(t)[l - p(t)] + p(t)u(t) = U(t) + 1 ~f · p(t)df. (17) 
Using integration by parts, we can rewrite the integral in equation (17) as 
I' au(f) J' op(t) -A • p(t)df = - -A • u(f)df + p(t)u(t) - p(t)u(t). 
1 at 1 at (18) 
Plugging this into equation (17) and rearranging terms, we get 
I./ op(t) A A x(t) = {x(t)[l - p(t)] - 1 --;Jf · u(t)dt }l[l - p(t)]. (19) 
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Hence, given a weakly increasing function p : T ~ [0, 1) and a value x(l), 
equation ( 19) can be used to derive the expected settlement function x : T ~ [0, 
1) necessary for (x, p) to be incentive compatible; for values oft where p(-) is 
nondifferentiable, xO is derived by the requirement that U(t; x, p) be continuous 
(such a set of types is countable, since p(·) is monotonic on a closed interval). 
Finally, since incentive compatibility and x(t&) :::=: u(t&) are sufficient conditions 
for individual rationality (by Lemma 5), we have the following characterization 
of outcomes in the set fl*. 
THEOREM: Let (x, p) E fl; then (x, p) E fl* if and only if p(t) is weakly 
increasing on T, U(t; p, x) is continuous on T, x(t&) :::=: u(t&), and for almost 
all t E Tb x(t) is as in equation (19). 
Hence, given an increasing probability of war function p(t), we can solve 
for the settlement conditional on no war x(t) that will "rationalize" p(t), in that 
the pair (x, p) constitute equilibrium behavior of some Bayesian game; if no such 
function x(t) exists then p(t) could not have been derived from equilibrium be-
havior.10 Alternatively, any outcome (x, p) derived from equilibrium behavior in 
a Bayesian game must satisfy equation ( 19) and the individual rationality condi-
tion x(t&) :::=: u(t&). 
EXAMPLE: Let T = [0, 1), u(t) = t/2, and p(t) = 1 - e- 1, so that p(O) 
= 0 and p(l) = 1 - lie; then x(t) = (t + 1)/2 - [112 - x(O)]e'. Indi-
vidual rationality implies x(l) :::=: 112, so that if 112 :::=: x(O) :::=: (e - 1)12e, 
the pair (x, p) is feasible (i.e., (x, p) E fl), incentive compatible, and 
individually rational. 
From equation (12), we can also say something about whether x(t) is in-
creasing faster or slower than p(t) at any separating type: 
ax I ap I - ~-
at ,. at ,. 
as [x(t') - u(t')] ~ [l - p(t')]. (20) 
Therefore, if the difference in expected utility from resolving the dispute versus 
war is large relative to the probability of resolving the dispute, then the expected 
utility from resolution is increasing faster than the probability of war. Further, 
since equation (19) holds for amost all types, we see that if (x, p) E fl* then the 
function x(t)[l - p(t)] is decreasing in t. Thus, 
ax 1 ap 1 
--~----
at x(t) at 1 - p(t) (21) 
Multiplying both sides by t (recall T C IR+) results in expressions known in 
economics as elasticities (cf. Takayama 1986), where the elasticity Ex = l[ax/ 
'°Of course, the reverse analysis works as well (i.e., given an increasing function x: T -
(0, !], we can solve for the required p: T- (0, !]). 
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at]·[tlx(t)]I measures the percentage change in x due to a percentage change in 
t; similarly for Ep == ICa(l - p(t))!at]·[tl(l - p(t))Ji = [(Jp/at]·[t/(l - p(t))]. 
Elasticities are useful in that they give a dimension-free measure of the respon-
siveness of a function, in contrast to a derivative. From equation (21), we have 
the following result. 
COROLLARY: If (x, p) E il*, then Ep;;,,, Ex, that is, the probability of no 
war, 1 - p(t), is more elastic than x(t), the settlement conditional on 
no war. 
Therefore, a 1 % increase in player 1 's expected benefits from war leads to 
a greater percentage decrease in the probability of no war than the percentage 
increase in the expected benefits from resolving the dispute short of war. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has analyzed a simple model of crisis bargaining with incom-
plete information where, rather than specify the actual game the participants 
play, we derived results which hold for any equilibrium of any such game. In 
this fashion we can unambiguously determine the effect on crisis bargaining 
outcomes (i.e., the probability of war and the benefits from resolving the dispute 
short of war) of the expected benefits from war. We see that the higher the 
informed player's benefits from war, the more likely the dispute will end in war; 
conversely, if the dispute is settled short of war, the better is the negotiated 
settlement. 
From a methodological perspective, it is important to point out that the 
approach taken in the current paper should not be viewed as a substitute for the 
more common approach of explicitly modeling the game. This immediately fol-
lows by noting what the incentive compatibility approach cannot do. Most im-
portant, this approach cannot address the issue of the informed player's perceived 
level of expected benefits from war, where such a perception is summarized ex 
ante by player 2 's prior belief f( ·) concerning 1 's type. Since the function f( ·) is 
an actual parameter of the model, meaningful results on the effect of changes in 
f( ·) on equilibrium outcomes requires the explicit modeling approach. Rather, 
these two approaches should be seen as complimentary, in that incentive com-
patibility can generate certain types of results, while the specifics of the game 
form hypothesized can generate others. In particular, a "two-step" approach to 
incomplete information games might be useful, where the first step would be to 
generate as many results as possible from simply the specification of the environ-
ment and the resulting incentive compatibility constraints, and then move on to 
the specification of a particular game form and the determination of a particular 
behavioral prediction. 
In terms of generalizing the current model, the most obvious extension 
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would be to have player 2 possess private information as well. In such a situa-
tion, then, both players would face incentive compatibility constraints, and the 
results would then pertain to the behavior of both players. If we think of player 
2's information concerning her own expected benefits from war, then it is not too 
difficult to foresee how the monotonicity results of section 3 will generalize. 
However, the constraints on each player's behavior will also include the prior 
beliefs that concern the opponent's type, so that generalizing the characteriza-
tion theorem of section 4 will prove to be a little trickier. Other possible exten-
sions, such as expanding the outcome space to include the temporal length of the 
bargaining prior to either compromise or war, should be explored in further 
research. 
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